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Abstract
How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability aﬀect the optimal
monetary and ﬁscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we
employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal inter-
est rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on
two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-ﬁnanced government
spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the
prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreas-
ing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming
more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to
dampen the fall in output and inﬂation at the outset of the liquidity trap.
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11 Introduction
New Keynesian characterizations of optimal time-consistent monetary and ﬁscal policies in a
liquidity trap typically omit government debt from the analysis, assuming that government
purchases are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes (e.g. Werning, 2011; Schmidt, 2012; Nakata,
2013). At the same time, the enormous increase in government debt-to-GDP ratios in the
course of the recent global ﬁnancial crisis in major industrialized countries raises important
questions about the appropriate stance of monetary and ﬁscal policy. Should policymakers
adhere to ﬁscal stimulus in the face of a zero lower bound event if the level of government
debt is already above its long-run target? How does the need to ensure debt sustainability
act upon the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy? In terms of model-based characterizations of
optimal policies at the zero lower bound, is the conventional omission of government debt
innocuous or do our normative prescriptions change when we account for the fact that lump-
sum taxes in general do not adjust one-to-one with other ﬁscal variables?
We address these questions in a stylized stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero
bound on nominal interest rates that accounts for government debt in the form of non-
state-contingent, one-period, nominal government bonds as a means of ﬁnancing government
spending. The benevolent government controls the short-term nominal interest rate and the
level of government spending, and decides about the supply of government bonds. Hence,
in the economy that we consider the central bank and the ﬁscal authority coordinate their
policy measures. We focus on time-consistent policy regimes since it is the absence of a
commitment device that renders the zero lower bound detrimental for stabilization policy.1
Households appreciate private consumption as well as the provision of public goods and dis-
like labor. For the ease of exposition, we assign only a very limited role to tax policy in our
baseline model. First, private consumption and household labor income are taxed at constant
rates, providing revenues to the government. Second, lump-sum taxes are used to ﬁnance a
constant wage subsidy to ensure that the distortions arising from monopolistic competition
in the goods market and from the other taxes are eliminated in the non-stochastic steady
state. However, we also present results for the case where the policymaker sets the labor tax
rate optimally. Economic uncertainty arises from the presence of a demand shock.
We solve the model using a projection method and then explore how government debt af-
fects optimal policies and stabilization outcomes when the zero bound on nominal interest
rates becomes occasionally binding. The presence of government debt makes the optimal
time-consistent policy history dependent, that is, the future path of the policy instruments
1For a characterization of optimal monetary policy under commitment see e.g. Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003), Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005), Adam and Billi (2006) and Nakov (2008).
2depends on today’s level of government debt. We show, that, ﬁrst, for a given realization
of the demand shock, government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding gov-
ernment debt, i.e. the ﬁscal stance becomes more contractionary when government debt
rises. Second, as long as the zero lower bound is not binding, the nominal interest rate is
decreasing in the level of government debt. Real interest rates keep declining as a function
of the debt level even if the zero bound on the nominal rate is binding, i.e. the monetary
policy stance becomes more expansionary the higher the government debt burden. Third,
output and inﬂation are both increasing in beginning-of-period debt, irrespective of whether
the zero bound is binding or not.
How the economy responds to a liquidity trap thus critically depends on the prevailing gov-
ernment debt level. If, for instance, the level of outstanding government debt is high relative
to its steady state, then the optimal policy mix will prescribe at most a small government
spending stimulus, followed by a spending reversal, and a prolonged period of expansionary
monetary policy. The policymaker creates valid expectations of a subsequent boom in in-
ﬂation and output that help to dampen the economic turmoil at the outset of the liquidity
trap. If, on the other hand, the public debt level is low relative to its steady state, gov-
ernment spending is used forcefully to stimulate aggregate demand, when the economy falls
into a liquidity trap. In this situation, however, the zero bound episode is not followed by
a boom in output and inﬂation. Absent the expansionary expectations eﬀects of the high
debt scenario, the low debt scenario exhibits larger drops in output and inﬂation.
The ability to issue government debt allows the policymaker to inﬂuence private sector expec-
tations without engaging in time-inconsistent policies. As emphasized by Krugman (1998)
and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), during zero lower bound episodes, expectations about
future output and inﬂation can have considerable eﬀects on contemporaneous stabilization
outcomes. We demonstrate the powerfulness of government debt-induced history dependence
by comparing optimal discretionary policies and stabilization outcomes for a liquidity trap
scenario in our baseline economy with those in the conventional model setup that features
zero government debt and lump-sum taxes that adjust each period to balance the govern-
ment budget.
Our paper is closely related to work by Eggertsson (2006), who ﬁrst showed that the accu-
mulation of government debt allows a discretionary policymaker to inﬂuence expectations
about the path of monetary policy after the liquidity trap. Our paper diﬀers from this earlier
work in several respects. First, the ﬁscal instrument considered by Eggertsson is a lump-sum
tax. In his model, the policymaker lowers lump-sum taxes when the zero bound is binding
in order to increase government debt. Tax collection costs make it credible that the increase
in government debt will not be solely undone by future tax increases. There is no immediate
3trade-oﬀ for ﬁscal policy in a liquidity trap between stimulating the economy and stabilizing
government debt. In our paper, the liquidity trap shock reduces the tax base, which may
force the policymaker to tighten ﬁscal policy while the zero lower bound is binding. Second,
in Eggertsson’s model, the economy starts in a liquidity trap state and returns to the nor-
mal state with a constant probability in each subsequent period, where it will stay forever.
Instead, in our model, the zero nominal interest rate bound is an occasionally binding con-
straint. We show that the outstanding amount of government debt prior to the zero bound
event critically aﬀects stabilization policies and outcomes in the liquidity trap. For instance,
if government debt is low relative to its steady state, then the policymaker may refrain from
lowering the nominal interest rate all the way to zero, which exacerbates the fall in output
and inﬂation. Finally, we show, that, unlike in Eggertsson (2006), the optimal discretionary
policy is not necessarily associated with a transitory boom in output and inﬂation after the
liquidity trap.
The paper can also be related to studies that investigate optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy
under commitment at the zero lower bound and account for the presence of government debt.
Eggertsson and Woodford (2006) determine the optimal nominal interest rate and tax pol-
icy mix. Nakata (2011) characterizes the optimal plan for distortionary taxes, government
spending and the short-term nominal interest rate.
Finally, several studies have characterized optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in New Key-
nesian models that account for the presence of government debt but abstract from the zero
bound on nominal interest rates. Wren-Lewis and Leith (2007) and Vines and Stehn (2007)
characterize the optimal policy mix under discretion, whereas Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004) and Adam (2011) analyse optimal commitment policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model economy.
Section 3 speciﬁes the policy problem. Section 4 presents numerical results. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a small monetary business cycle model with nominal rigidities and monopolistic
competition. The economy is inhabited by a continuum of identical households of measure
one, a ﬁnal good producer, a continuum of intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrms of measure
one, and a benevolent policymaker. Following Woodford (2003), the model is treated as a
cashless limiting economy. Time is discrete and indexed by t.
42.1 Households and ﬁrms
The representative household obtains utility from a private consumption good Ct and the
provision of a public consumption good Gt, and dislikes labor Nt (i),∀i ∈ [0,1]. Expected
lifetime utility of the household reads
E0
∞  
t=0
β
t
 
u(Ct) + g (Gt) −
  1
0
ν (Nt(i))di
 
, (1)
where Et is the rational expectations operator conditional on information in period t and
β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. The functions u(·) and g (·) are increasing and concave in
their arguments, and ν (·) is increasing and convex in its argument.
The household enters period t with a degenerate portfolio of non-state-contingent, one-
period, nominal government bonds Bt−1, paying the household Bt−1/Pt units in terms
of the ﬁnal consumption good. For simplicity, we assume that one-period government
bonds are the only assets traded in the economy. The household supplies Nt (i) units
of labor to the producer of intermediate good i and earns total after-tax labor income
  1
0
 
1 − τN 
Wt (i)Nt (i)di, where Wt (i) denotes the nominal wage rate payed by ﬁrm i
and τN is a constant labor income tax rate. Furthermore, the household receives dividend
payments PtΨt from intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrms, which are owned by the household.
The household uses her labor income, dividend income and the government’s debt repay-
ment to ﬁnance purchases of the private consumption good at price
 
1 + τC 
Pt where τC is
a constant consumption tax rate, to pay lump-sum taxes PtTt, and to buy newly issued gov-
ernment bonds at price 1/(1 + it), where it ≥ 0 is the one-period, riskless, nominal interest
rate. The ﬂow budget constraint reads
 
1 + τ
C 
PtCt +
Bt
1 + it
≤
  1
0
 
1 − τ
N 
Wt(i)Nt(i)di + Bt−1 − PtTt + Ψt. (2)
The representative household maximizes her expected lifetime utility (1) by choosing state-
contingent plans {Ct > 0,Nt (i) > 0,Bt}∞
t=0 subject to (2) and a no-Ponzi game condition
lim
j→∞
Et
  
t+j  
k=0
1
1 + ik
 
Bt+j
 
≥ 0.
The ﬁnal consumption good is produced under perfect competition using the following
technology
Yt =
   1
0
Yt (i)
θ−1
θ di
  θ
θ−1
,
5where θ > 1 and Yt (i) denotes the intermediate input i. Total demand for the ﬁnal good
consists of household and government demand
Yt = Ct + Gt.
The market for intermediate goods features monopolistic competition. Expenditure mini-
mization by the producer of the ﬁnal good results in the following demand for intermediate
good i
Yt (i) =
 
Pt (i)
Pt
 −θ
Yt, (3)
where Pt (i) denotes the price charged by ﬁrm i and Pt =
   1
0 Pt (i)
1−θ di
  1
1−θ
represents the
price for the ﬁnal consumption good. Intermediate goods are produced using labor
Yt (i) = Nt (i).
There is no capital. Intermediate-goods ﬁrms face price rigidities ` a la Calvo (1983). In each
period, a fraction 1 − α of ﬁrms is allowed to change prices, whereas the remaining fraction
α ∈ (0,1) of ﬁrms keep their price constant at previous period’s level. Each intermediate
goods ﬁrm i that is allowed to reset prices in period t maximizes its expected discounted
proﬁts:
max
Pt(i)
∞  
j=0
EtQt,t+jα
jYt+j(i)[Pt(i) − (1 − τ)Wt+j(i)],
subject to (3). The parameter τ denotes a constant employment subsidy that eliminates
the distortions arising from monopolistic competition and distortionary taxes in the non-
stochastic steady state and Qt,t+j = βj U′(Ct+j)/Pt+j
U′(Ct)/Pt is the stochastic discount factor between
period t and t + j.
2.2 The government
The government issues non-state-contingent, one-period, nominal government bonds and
levies lump-sum taxes, labor income taxes and consumption taxes to ﬁnance public spending
and the provision of a constant wage subsidy τ, and to service the debt incurred from the
previous period. We assume that the government can credibly promise to repay its debt
each period. The ﬂow budget constraint reads
PtGt + τ
  1
0
Wt (i)Nt (i)di + Bt−1 =
Bt
1 + it
+ PtTt + τ
CPtCt + τ
N
  1
0
Wt(i)Nt(i)di.
6In real terms
Gt + τ
  1
0
wt (i)Nt (i)di + bt−1π
−1
t =
bt
1 + it
+ Tt + τ
CCt + τ
N
  1
0
wt(i)Nt(i)di,
where bt = Bt/Pt, πt = Pt/Pt−1, and wt(i) = Wt(i)/Pt.
Assumption 1 Lump-sum taxes are used to ﬁnance the wage subsidy. Beyond that, a con-
stant amount of (possibly negative) lump-sum tax revenues T G is available to ﬁnance gov-
ernment spending and to service public debt
Tt = T
G + τ
  1
0
wt (i)Nt (i)di.
We can then simplify the budget constraint
Gt + bt−1π
−1
t =
bt
1 + it
+ T
G + τ
CCt + τ
N
  1
0
wt(i)Nt(i)di. (4)
2.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of paths {Ct,Nt (i),Yt (i),Yt,Bt,Gt,it,Pt (i),Pt,Wt (i)}∞
t=0, given an
initial level of government debt B−1 and identical initial goods prices P−1 (i)∀i, such that
(i) {Ct,Nt (i),Bt}∞
t=0 solves the household optimization problem given prices and policies,
(ii){Pt (i)}∞
t=0 solves the optimization problem of producer i, (iii) the government budget
constraint and the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate it ≥ 0 are satisﬁed, and
(iv) the goods market, the labor market, and the government bond market clear.
2.4 Log-linear approximation
The optimization problems of households and ﬁrms are standard, we therefore refrain from
presenting optimality conditions and directly continue with a log-linear approximation of the
resulting behavioral constraints around the non-stochastic steady state with zero inﬂation
ˆ πt = κ
 
ˆ Yt − Γ ˆ Gt
 
+ βEtˆ πt+1 (5)
ˆ Yt = ˆ Gt + Etˆ Yt+1 − Et ˆ Gt+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etˆ πt+1 − r
∗) + dt. (6)
Hat variables denote percentage deviations from the deterministic steady state. ˆ πt is the
inﬂation rate between period t − 1 and t, ˆ Yt represents real output, and ˆ Gt denotes gov-
ernment spending expressed as a share of steady state output. The parameter r∗ = 1
β − 1
7denotes the steady state real interest rate, and σ ≡ −
u′′(C)
u′(C)Y represents the elasticity of the
marginal utility of private consumption with respect to total output in the steady state. The
parameters κ and Γ are functions of structural parameters
κ =
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α(1 + ηθ)
(σ + η), Γ =
σ
σ + η
,
where η > 0 denotes the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, α ∈ (0,1) represents the
share of ﬁrms that are unable to change their price in a given period, and θ > 1 is the price
elasticity of demand for intermediate goods. We assume that the economy is subject to an
exogenous demand shock dt that follows a stationary autoregressive process
dt = ρdt−1 + ǫt, (7)
where ǫt is a i.i.d. N(0,σ2
ǫ) innovation, and ρ ∈ [0,1).
Finally, the log-linearized government budget constraint (4) reads2
ˆ bt =
1
β
 
ˆ bt−1 −
b
Y
ˆ πt +
 
1 + τ
C +
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
Nσ
 
ˆ Gt −
 
τ
C +
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
N (1 + σ + η)
 
ˆ Yt
 
+
b
Y
(it − r
∗), (8)
where ˆ bt = bt−b
Y .
3 The policy problem
The benevolent policymaker aims to maximize expected lifetime utility (1) of the representa-
tive household. We conduct a linear-quadratic approximation to household welfare to obtain
a quadratic policy objective function.3 Each period t, the policymaker minimizes the loss
function from period t onwards, taking the decision rules of the private sector and future
governments as given. We focus on stationary Markov-perfect equilibria, where the vector of
state variables consists of the demand shock and the beginning-of-period government debt
2In the deterministic steady state
 
1 + τC  G
Y + (1 − β) b
Y = T
G
Y + τC + 1+τ
C
1−τN τN.
3See Schmidt (2012) for the details of the derivation. We ensure that the non-stochastic steady state of the
ﬂexible-price equilibrium is eﬃcient by choosing the constant wage subsidy such that it oﬀsets the distortions
arising from monopolistic competition and taxes in the non-stochastic steady state, τ = 1 − θ−1
θ
1−τ
N
1+τC .
8level, st = (dt,ˆ bt−1). The Bellman equation reads
V (st) = min
{ˆ πt,ˆ Yt, ˆ Gt,it,ˆ bt}
 
1
2
 
ˆ π
2
t + λ
 
ˆ Yt − Γ ˆ Gt
 2
+ λG ˆ G
2
t
 
+ βEtV (st+1)
 
subject to
ˆ πt = βEtˆ π(st+1) + κ
 
ˆ Yt − Γ ˆ Gt
 
ˆ Yt = ˆ Gt + Etˆ Y (st+1) − Et ˆ G(st+1) −
1
σ
(it − Etˆ π(st+1) − r
∗) + dt
ˆ bt =
1
β
 
ˆ bt−1 −
b
Y
ˆ πt +
 
1 + τ
C +
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
Nσ
 
ˆ Gt −
 
τ
C +
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
N (1 + σ + η)
 
ˆ Yt
 
+
b
Y
(it − r
∗)
it ≥ 0,
and the law of motion for the demand shock (7). The functions ˆ π(st+1), ˆ Y (st+1) and ˆ G(st+1)
represent the inﬂation rate, output and government spending that the policymaker expects
to be realized in period t + 1 in equilibrium, contingent on the realization of the demand
shock dt+1. The relative weights λ and λG in the policymaker’s objective function depend
on the structural parameters
λ =
κ
θ
, λG = λΓ
 
1 − Γ +
ω
σ
 
,
where ω ≡ −
g′′(G)
g′(G)Y is the elasticity of the marginal utility of public consumption with
respect to total output.
The ﬁrst-order conditions read
λG ˆ Gt +
 
1
β
+ (1 − Γ)
b
Y
σ +
1
β
(1 − Γ)τ
C −
1
β
Γ
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
N
 
Φ
b
t − (1 − Γ)Φ
zlb
t = 0 (9)
EtΦ
b(st+1) − Ω1tΦ
b
t + Ω2tˆ πt − Ω3tΦ
zlb
t = 0(10)
Φ
zlb
t it = 0(11)
Φ
zlb
t ≥ 0(12)
it ≥ 0(13)
9as well as the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the dynamic IS curve and the government
budget constraint, where
Φ
zlb
t ≡
 
b
Y
 
σ +
κ
β
 
+
1
β
 
τ
C +
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
N (1 + σ + η)
  
Φ
b
t −
 
κˆ πt + λ
 
ˆ Yt − Γ ˆ Gt
  
Ω1t ≡ 1 − σ
b
Y
 
∂Etˆ Y (st+1)
∂ˆ bt
−
∂Et ˆ G(st+1)
∂ˆ bt
 
Ω2t ≡ β
∂Etˆ π(st+1)
∂ˆ bt
Ω3t ≡
∂Etˆ Y (st+1)
∂ˆ bt
−
∂Et ˆ G(st+1)
∂ˆ bt
+
1
σ
∂Etˆ π(st+1)
∂ˆ bt
.
The variable Φb
t is the multiplier associated with the government budget constraint and
Φzlb
t represents the (normalized) multiplier associated with the zero lower bound constraint.
Solving condition (9) for government spending, we get
ˆ Gt =
1
λG
 
(1 − Γ)Φ
zlb
t −
 
1
β
+ (1 − Γ)
b
Y
σ +
1
β
(1 − Γ)τ
C −
1
β
Γ
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
N
 
Φ
b
t
 
. (14)
Assumption 2 The parameters satisfy
 
1 + Γ + τC 
τN ≤ 1 + (1 − Γ)τC.
This assumption is suﬃcient to ensure that the coeﬃcient on Φb
t in (14) is negative.
Note, ﬁrst, that the second term in equation (14) would vanish if we assumed that government
spending is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes. In this case, government spending would only be
used as a stabilization tool if the zero lower bound were binding, and the ﬁscal policy stance
during zero bound events would be unequivocally expansionary, see Schmidt (2012).
In the model with government debt, however, public spending may have to deviate from its
steady state level even if the economy is away from the zero lower bound so that Φzlb
t = 0.
Intuitively, whenever monetary policy is unable to stabilize government debt as well as
inﬂation and output simultaneously, government spending will be used as an additional
stabilization tool.
Furthermore, from (14) it is not clear whether ﬁscal policy in a liquidity trap should be
expansionary, ˆ Gt > 0, or contractionary, ˆ Gt < 0. Speciﬁcally, if Φb
t > 0, the zero bound
multiplier and the government budget constraint multiplier have opposite implications for
the sign of the ﬁscal policy response. As we will show below, stabilization outcomes and
policies in a liquidity trap critically depend on the amount of outstanding government debt
when hitting the zero bound.
104 Numerical results
In this section, we characterize the optimal time-consistent policy mix numerically. The
policy functions are approximated using a projection method with ﬁnite elements. The
procedure is described in the Appendix. The baseline calibration is presented in Table 1,
where the period length is one quarter. The steady state real interest rate and the law of
motion of the demand shock are calibrated based on U.S. data for 1983 to 2010. We set
the ratio of government spending to total output in the deterministic steady state equal
to 0.2. The labor income tax rate is set to 0.3 and the consumption tax rate to 0.1, as
in Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013). In the baseline, the steady state government
debt to annualized output ratio is set to 0.5 but we also consider lower and higher values
in the sensitivity analysis. All other structural parameters assume standard values from the
literature.
Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Interpretation
r∗ 2.6/4 Steady state natural real rate of interest (in %)
β 0.9950 Discount factor
G/Y 0.2 Steady state share of government spending in total output
τN 0.3 Labor income tax rate
τC 0.1 Private consumption tax rate
b/(4Y ) 0.5 Steady state government debt to output ratio
α 0.66 Share of ﬁrms per period that keep prices unchanged
θ 7.66 Price elasticity of demand in the steady state
η 1 Inverse of labor supply elasticity
σ 0.5/(1 − G/Y ) Elasticity of marginal utility of private consumption w.r.t. total output
ω 0.5/(G/Y ) Elasticity of marginal utility of public consumption w.r.t. total output
κ 0.0333 Slope parameter in New Keynesian Phillips curve
ρ 0.77 AR-coeﬃcient demand shock
σǫ 0.72 Standard deviation demand shock innovation (in %)
λ 0.0043 Loss function weight I
λG 0.0077 Loss function weight II
4.1 Optimal time-consistent policy in a liquidity trap
We begin our discussion of the optimal time-consistent policy with an experiment where
the occurrence of a large negative demand shock pushes the economy for several quarters
into a liquidity trap. Figure 1 shows impulse responses of output, inﬂation, government
spending, the nominal interest rate, government debt and the real interest rate to a negative
demand shock of −3 unconditional standard deviations when the economy is initially in the
risky steady state. The realized paths in the absence of any further shocks are represented by
solid lines, the expected paths as of period 0 are represented by dashed lines and blue-shaded
11areas represent conﬁdence intervals. The demand shock materializing in period 0 drives the
Figure 1: Impulse responses to a negative demand shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a −3 unconditional standard deviation demand shock for the baseline calibration.
Realized path (solid line), path expected in period 0 (dashed line), 50%, 75% and 90% conﬁdence intervals
(shaded areas). Inﬂation and interest rates are expressed in annualized terms. Government debt is expressed
as a share of annualized steady state output, government spending is expressed as a share of steady state
output.
natural real rate of interest r∗
t = r∗ + σdt into negative territory and forces the policymaker
to lower the short-term nominal interest rate to zero where it stays for several periods. The
economy starts to contract, both output and inﬂation drop below their target levels, and the
reduction in the tax base leads to an increase in government debt. The ﬁscal policy response is
ﬁrst expansionary, contributing to the accumulation of government debt, but turns slightly
contractionary before the zero bound episode ends. Figure 2 decomposes the response of
government spending into the response of the zero lower bound multiplier component (dashed
line) and the response of the budget constraint multiplier component (dashed-dotted line)
12as in equation (14). Initially, both components exhibit a positive sign, which means that
Figure 2: Decomposition of government spending response
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−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
quarters
 
 
Government spending
ZLB component
BC component
Notes: Impulse responses of government spending (solid line), the zero lower bound mul-
tiplier component 1−Γ
λG Φzlb
t (dashed line) and the budget constraint multiplier component
− 1
λG
 
1
β + (1 − Γ) b
Y σ + 1
β (1 − Γ)τC − 1
βΓ 1+τ
C
1−τN τN
 
Φb
t (dashed-dotted line) to a demand shock of
−3 unconditional standard deviations.
Φzlb
t > 0 and Φb
t < 0. The negative budget constraint multiplier implies that it would have
been desirable from a welfare perspective if the government had entered the period with
a somewhat higher debt level. However, in subsequent periods when the government debt
burden has become more elevated the budget constraint multiplier component switches signs,
turning from positive to negative, and government spending declines below its pre-shock level.
Coming back to Figure 1, while the increased debt burden narrows the room for expansionary
ﬁscal policy, it facilitates the implementation of an expansionary monetary policy stimulus.
Once the natural real rate has reentered positive territory, the nominal interest rate remains
transitorily below the level that would be warranted by output and inﬂation stabilization
considerations alone in order to contribute to the stabilization of government debt. As a
consequence, the economy experiences a small boom in output and inﬂation. Importantly,
private agents attach positive probabilities to positive future realizations of output and
inﬂation and (correctly) expect both variables to move temporarily above their target levels,
13which attenuates the drop at the outset of the zero bound event.
4.2 Equilibrium responses to government debt
To provide a more general characterization of the optimal time-consistent policy and how
it is aﬀected by the level of outstanding government debt, Figure 3 displays equilibrium
responses to the beginning-of-period government debt level. We consider two alternative
realizations of the demand shock, d = 0 (solid line) and d = −3 unconditional standard
deviations (dashed line). For both values of d, the optimal amount of government spending
Figure 3: Equilibrium responses to previous period’s government debt
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Notes: Equilibrium responses to the beginning-of-period government debt level. The demand shock is either
set equal to zero (solid line) or to −3 unconditional standard deviations (dashed line). Inﬂation and interest
rates are expressed in annualized terms. Government debt is expressed as a share of annualized steady state
output, government spending is expressed as a share of steady state output.
is decreasing in the public debt burden. Thus, if the beginning-of-period level of government
debt is high, the ﬁscal policy response to a liquidity trap becomes considerably muted. At
the same time, inﬂation and output are both increasing in the level of outstanding public
14debt. Monetary policy turns out to be crucial to understand this result. The higher the
level of government debt incurred from the previous period the lower the nominal interest
rate, as long as the zero lower bound is not binding. In other words, under the optimal
policy mix, monetary policy bears part of the responsibility to stabilize government debt.
Moreover, the real interest rate keeps decreasing in the level of outstanding debt even if the
zero nominal interest rate bound is binding, reﬂecting the positive eﬀect of government debt
on expected future inﬂation. Intuitively, if monetary policy is unable to lower the current
nominal interest rate further, because the zero bound is binding, future monetary policy will
have to stabilize government debt, thereby stimulating future output and inﬂation. If, on the
contrary, the level of outstanding government debt is low relative to the steady state, when a
large negative demand shock hits the economy, then the policymaker may even refrain from
lowering the nominal interest rate immediately all the way to zero. While the government
spending stimulus in such states is particularly large, the decline in output and inﬂation is
more pronounced than in states with higher levels of outstanding government debt.
4.3 Comparison to the case without government debt
In the previous parts, we have characterized the optimal time-consistent policy mix in the
presence of government debt. We now compare this optimal policy mix to the one in an
economy where government debt is zero, distortionary taxes are zero as well, and lump-sum
taxes are free to adjust each period to balance the budget. Figures 4 and 5 show impulse
responses to a negative demand shock for the two economies.4 The policymaker in the model
without government debt engages in a more pronounced ﬁscal stimulus and implements a
lower nominal interest rate path than his counterpart in the economy with government debt.
Nevertheless, the drop in output and inﬂation turns out to be considerably larger. The
comparison shows how powerful history dependence is in aﬀecting stabilization outcomes
by shaping private sector expectations. In the economy without government debt, agents
anticipate that the policymaker will never allow inﬂation to rise above target, which is
reﬂected in the corresponding conﬁdence intervals. In contrast, agents in the model with
government debt anticipate that if current conditions got worse so that government debt
increased, future monetary policy would respond to today’s economic conditions by becoming
more accommodative than would be warranted by future inﬂation and output gap dynamics
alone. Hence, they attach positive probabilities to above-target future output and inﬂation,
and the expected real interest rate path lies below its counterpart in the model without
4For the comparison we set σ = 3−1/(1−G/Y ) and ω = 3−1/(G/Y ), since the model without government
debt cannot be solved for the baseline calibration. The eﬀect of this change in parameter values is addressed
in the sensitivity analysis.
15Figure 4: Impulse responses with and without government debt
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Notes: Impulse responses to a −3 unconditional standard deviation demand shock for the economy with
positive government debt (left) and for an economy with zero government debt (right). Except for σ =
3−1/(1 − G/Y ) and ω = 3−1/(G/Y ), the baseline calibration is used. Inﬂation and interest rates are
expressed in annualized terms. Government debt is expressed as a share of annualized steady state output,
government spending is expressed as a share of steady state output.
government debt.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of results to preference parameters, the degree
of price stickiness and the choice of the steady state debt-to-output ratio.
First, we consider how the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in private and public
spending aﬀects stabilization policies and outcomes in a liquidity trap. Figure 6 shows im-
pulse responses for the baseline calibration and for the case of somewhat higher intertemporal
elasticities, σ = 3−1/(1−G/Y ) and ω = 3−1/(G/Y ). The change in σ increases the interest
elasticity of aggregate demand, rendering monetary policy more eﬀective in stabilizing output
16Figure 5: Impulse responses with and without government debt
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
O
u
t
p
u
t
With government debt
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
I
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
a
t
e
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−1
0
1
2
3
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
d
e
b
t
quarters
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
Without government debt
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
−1
0
1
2
3
quarters
Notes: Impulse responses to a −3 unconditional standard deviation demand shock for the economy with
positive government debt (left) and for an economy with zero government debt (right). Except for σ =
3−1/(1 − G/Y ) and ω = 3−1/(G/Y ), the baseline calibration is used. Inﬂation and interest rates are
expressed in annualized terms. Government debt is expressed as a share of annualized steady state output,
government spending is expressed as a share of steady state output.
and inﬂation than under the baseline calibration. Consequently, we observe smaller declines
of output and inﬂation. Government debt increases by less so that no ﬁscal retrenchment is
necessary to stabilize the economy, and output and inﬂation do not overshoot their target
levels.
Figure 7 shows impulse responses for two alternative degrees of price stickiness, the baseline
case with a Calvo parameter of α = 0.66 (solid line) and an alternative case with more price
rigidities, α = 0.75 (dashed line). The policy responses for the two calibrations are very
similar. In case of a higher degree of price stickiness, however, inﬂation is less responsive to
variations in current real activity so that the initial drop in the inﬂation rate as well as the
subsequent boom are more muted than under the baseline calibration.
Finally, Figure 8 compares impulse responses for the baseline calibration to the case of a
17Figure 6: Impulse responses for alternative intertemporal elasticities of substitution
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Notes: Impulse responses to a −3 unconditional standard deviation demand shock for the baseline calibration
(solid line) and in case of higher intertemporal elasticities of substitution (dashed line). Inﬂation and interest
rates are expressed in annualized terms. Government debt is expressed as a share of annualized steady state
output, government spending is expressed as a share of steady state output.
lower (30%) and a higher (65%) steady state government debt-to-output ratio. The higher
the steady state debt ratio, the more leverage do changes in the nominal interest rate have
over the government’s interest rate payments. Hence, in case of the low steady state debt
ratio, monetary policy is less eﬀective in stabilizing government debt and therefore keeps
nominal interest rates low for longer than in the baseline case. At the same time, ﬁscal
policy is less expansionary and engages in a stronger subsequent retrenchment in order to
stabilize government debt and to mitigate the boom in future output and inﬂation. Never-
theless, output and inﬂation decline less on impact than in the baseline case. Conversely,
in the case of the high steady state government debt-to-output ratio the policymaker imple-
ments a bigger spending stimulus but keeps monetary policy less accommodative, resulting
in somewhat larger drops in output and inﬂation.
18Figure 7: Impulse responses for alternative degrees of price stickiness
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Notes: Impulse responses to a −3 unconditional standard deviation demand shock for the baseline calibration
(solid line) and for a higher degree of price stickiness of α = 0.75(dashed line). Inﬂation and interest rates are
expressed in annualized terms. Government debt is expressed as a share of annualized steady state output,
government spending is expressed as a share of steady state output.
4.5 Labor income tax as additional policy instrument
In this section, we relax the assumption of a constant labor income tax rate, endowing the
policymaker with an additional ﬁscal instrument. The modiﬁed Bellman equation then reads
as follows:
V (st) = min
{ˆ πt,ˆ Yt, ˆ Gt,it,ˆ bt,ˆ τN
t }
 
1
2
 
ˆ π
2
t + λ
 
ˆ Yt − Γ ˆ Gt
 2
+ λG ˆ G
2
t
 
+ βEtV (st+1)
 
19Figure 8: Impulse responses for alternative steady state government debt ratios
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Notes: Impulse responses to a −3 unconditional standard deviation demand shock in case of steady state
debt-to-output ratios of 30% (dashed lines), 50% (solid lines) and 65% (dashed-dotted lines). Inﬂation and
interest rates are expressed in annualized terms. Government debt is expressed as a share of annualized
steady state output, government spending is expressed as a share of steady state output.
subject to
ˆ πt = βEtˆ π(st+1) + κ
 
ˆ Yt − Γ ˆ Gt +
(σ + η)−1
1 − τN ˆ τ
N
t
 
ˆ Yt = ˆ Gt + Etˆ Y (st+1) − Et ˆ G(st+1) −
1
σ
(it − Etˆ π(st+1) − r
∗) + dt
ˆ bt =
1
β
 
ˆ bt−1 −
b
Y
ˆ πt +
 
1 + τ
C +
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
Nσ
 
ˆ Gt −
 
τ
C +
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
N (1 + σ + η)
 
ˆ Yt
−
1 + τC
(1 − τN)
2ˆ τ
N
t
 
+
b
Y
(it − r
∗)
it ≥ 0,
20and the law of motion for the demand shock (7), where ˆ τN
t = τN
t − τN. All parameters
are deﬁned as before. The ﬁrst-order optimality conditions are provided in the Appendix.
Figure 9 displays impulse responses to a negative demand shock that drives the economy
into a liquidity trap5. Upon occurrence of the shock, the labor income tax rate is initially
Figure 9: Impulse responses - variable labor income tax rate
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Notes: Impulse responses to a −3 unconditional standard deviation demand shock for the baseline calibration.
Realized path (solid line), path expected in period 0 (dashed line), 50%, 75% and 90% conﬁdence intervals
(shaded areas). Inﬂation and interest rates are expressed in annualized terms. Government debt is expressed
as a share of annualized steady state output, government spending is expressed as a share of steady state
output. Labor income tax rate is expressed as percentage point deviation from its steady state level.
lowered considerably and then raised above its steady state level in subsequent periods, be-
fore gradually returning to its long-run level. The responses of the real interest rate and
government spending are similar to those in the baseline setup. Government debt increases,
starting however from a higher stochastic steady state than in the baseline model. While
5We again set σ = 3−1/(1 − G/Y ) and ω = 3−1/(G/Y ), since the model with variable labor income tax
rate could not be solved for the baseline calibration.
21agents continue to attach a positive probability to positive future inﬂation rates, they now
do not attach much weight on the possibility of future output being above target.
To understand how the additional policy instrument aﬀects the optimal policy mix and
stabilization outcomes, Figure 10 displays equilibrium responses to the beginning-of-period
government debt level. We again focus on two alternative realizations of the demand shock,
d = 0 (solid line) and d = −3 unconditional standard deviations (dashed line). There are
Figure 10: Equilibrium responses to previous period’s government debt - variable labor
income tax rate
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Notes: Equilibrium responses to the beginning-of-period government debt level. The demand shock is either
set equal to zero (solid line) or to −3 unconditional standard deviations (dashed line). Inﬂation and interest
rates are expressed in annualized terms. Government debt is expressed as a share of annualized steady
state output, government spending is expressed as a share of steady state output. Labor income tax rate is
expressed as percentage point deviation from its steady state level.
several important diﬀerences to the case with constant tax rates. First, the equilibrium
responses of the end-of-period government debt level to beginning-of-period debt are almost
ﬂat. In addition, also government spending and the interest rate vary much less with out-
22standing government debt than in the baseline setup. Instead, the labor income tax rate
now becomes strongly increasing in the beginning-of-period debt level. Essentially, the pol-
icymaker uses the labor income tax rate to implement the desired level of government debt.
For a given beginning-of-period government debt level, the optimal amount of debt is higher
when there is a negative demand shock, and hence the optimal tax rate is lower. Since the
labor tax rate aﬀects marginal costs, the inﬂation rate is also increasing in the government
debt level. In contrast, output is now slightly decreasing in the debt level, and remains
always close to its target level as long as the economy is not in a liquidity trap. Since the
policymaker can always use the labor income tax rate to achieve the desired government debt
level, there is now a much weaker link between the current debt level and future monetary
policy. Consequently, in case of the large negative demand shock the equilibrium response of
the real interest rate is essentially ﬂat. In this respect, the use of the labor income tax rate
as an additional policy instrument reduces the amount of history dependence in monetary
policy.
5 Conclusion
How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability aﬀect the optimal, time-
consistent monetary and ﬁscal policy response to a liquidity trap? We address this question
using a small, stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates
and focusing on two policy instruments, the short-term nominal interest rate and government
spending ﬁnanced by non-state-contingent, nominal government bonds. Under the optimal
time-consistent policy mix, government spending is a decreasing function of the level of
outstanding government debt. Whereas in models with freely adjusting lump-sum taxes it
is optimal for a discretionary policymaker to raise government spending in a liquidity trap,
in our model a high government debt level might force the policymaker to lower government
spending despite a binding zero bound. At the same time, the monetary policy stance
becomes more expansionary the higher the level of government debt. Crucially, the real
interest rate keeps declining as a function of government debt when the nominal interest
rate is constrained by the zero bound. Hence, the lack of ﬁscal stimulus in a liquidity trap
characterized by a high government debt burden is compensated by a more accommodative
future nominal interest rate policy.
23Appendix
A Numerical algorithm
Let Z =
 
ˆ π ˆ Y ˆ G i Φb
 ′
and ˜ Z =
 
ˆ π ˆ Y ˆ G Φb
 ′
. We approximate Z by a linear
combination of n basis functions ψj, j = 1,...,n. In matrix notation
Z
 
d,ˆ b−1
 
≈ CΨ
 
d,ˆ b−1
 
, (A.1)
where
C =


    

cπ
1 ··· cπ
n
cY
1 ··· cY
n
cG
1 ··· cG
n
ci
1 ··· ci
n
cΦ
1 ··· cΦ
n


    

, Ψ
 
d,ˆ b−1
 
=

  

ψ1
 
d,ˆ b−1
 
. . .
ψn
 
d,ˆ b−1
 

  

.
The coeﬃcients ch
j, j = 1,2,...,n; h ∈ {π,Y,G,i,Φ}, are set such that (A.1) holds exactly
at n selected collocation nodes
Z
 
X(k,:)
 
= CΨ
 
X(k,:)
 
, (A.2)
for k = 1,...,n, where
X =
   
ιb ⊗ ¯ d
 ′
 ¯ b−1 ⊗ ιd
 ′
 ′
is a n×2 matrix, and X(k,:) refers to the elements in row k of matrix X. ιp is a column vector
of ones with length np, p ∈ {d,b}. The column vectors ¯ d and ¯ b−1 contain the grid points of
the demand shock and the lagged level of government debt, respectively. The vectors have
length np. It holds n = nd · nb.
The iterative solution algorithm is based on two nested loops: one outer loop (counter s1)
targeted at the convergence of the derivatives of the expectations functions and an inner loop
(counter s2) seeking convergence of policy function coeﬃcients. The algorithm then works
as follows:
1. At the initial iteration step, we start with a guess for the coeﬃcient matrix C(0,0) and
for the partial derivatives of the expectation functions ∂Eˆ π
∂ˆ b
(0), ∂Eˆ Y
∂ˆ b
(0)
, ∂E ˆ G
∂ˆ b
(0)
.
2. At iteration step s1 of the outer loop, we proceed as follows.
(a) At iteration step s2 of the inner loop, we use the guess C(s1,s2) to determine the
24level of government debtˆ b at the n collocation nodes. Using the budget constraint:
ˆ b
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+
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X(k,:)
 
− r
∗
 
,
for k = 1,...,n.
(b) Next, we update the expectation functions:
Eˆ π
(s1,s2)  
X(k,:)
 
=
m  
l=1
̟lC
(s1,s2)
(1,:) Ψ
 
ρX(k,1) + ǫ(l),ˆ b
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=
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l=1
̟lC
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(2,:) Ψ
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X(k,:)
 
=
m  
l=1
̟lC
(s1,s2)
(5,:) Ψ
 
ρX(k,1) + ǫ(l),ˆ b
(s1,s2)  
X(k,:)
  
,
for k = 1,...,n. A Gaussian quadrature scheme is used to discretize the normally
distributed random variable, where ǫ is a vector of quadrature nodes with length
m and ̟ is a vector of length m containing the weights.
(c) Assuming ﬁrst, that the zero bound is not binding at any collocation node, the
optimality conditions for the discretionary policy regime imply
Z
(s1,s2)  
X(k,:)
 
=
 
A
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X(k,:)
  −1
· B +
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A
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  −1
· D · X(k,1),
(A.3)
25for k = 1,...,n, where
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For those k for which the zero lower bound is violated, i.e. i(s1,s2)  
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< 0,
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in (A.3) is replaced by
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where the element in the vth row and wth column of the n × n matrix Ψ(X)
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. For given s1, we then update
C
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(s1,s2),
where ζ2 ∈ (0,1], and continue iterating on the inner loop until
   vec
  ¯ C
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∞ < δ.
After convergence of the inner loop, we update the derivatives of the expectations
functions with respect to ˆ b. Let
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(s1,¯ s2)  
X(k,:)
  
∂E ˆ G
∂ˆ b
(s1+1)  
X(k,:)
 
≡
m  
l=1
̟lC
(s1,¯ s2)
(3,:) Ψb
 
ρX(k,1) + ǫ(l),ˆ b
(s1,¯ s2)  
X(k,:)
  
,
where Ψb (···) represents the ﬁrst derivative of the basis functions with respect to the
second argument ˆ b, and ¯ s2 represents the last iteration step in the inner loop before
convergence. The guess for the partial derivatives of the expectations functions is then
27updated as follows
∂Eˆ π
∂ˆ b
(s1+1)  
X(k,:)
 
= ζ1
∂Eˆ π
∂ˆ b
(s1+1)  
X(k,:)
 
+ (1 − ζ1)
∂Eˆ π
∂ˆ b
(s1)  
X(k,:)
 
∂Eˆ Y
∂ˆ b
(s1+1)  
X(k,:)
 
= ζ1
∂Eˆ Y
∂ˆ b
(s1+1)  
X(k,:)
 
+ (1 − ζ1)
∂Eˆ Y
∂ˆ b
(s1)  
X(k,:)
 
∂E ˆ G
∂ˆ b
(s1+1)  
X(k,:)
 
= ζ1
∂E ˆ G
∂ˆ b
(s1+1)  
X(k,:)
 
+ (1 − ζ1)
∂E ˆ G
∂ˆ b
(s1)  
X(k,:)
 
,
for k = 1,...,n, with updating parameter ζ1 ∈ (0,1]. Finally, we set C(s1+1,0) = C(s1,s2).
3. The algorithm ends when:
                               
vec

         

∂Eˆ π
∂ˆ b
(s1+1)  
X(k,:)
 
−
∂Eˆ π
∂ˆ b
(s1)  
X(k,:)
 
∂Eˆ Y
∂ˆ b
(s1+1)  
X(k,:)
 
−
∂Eˆ Y
∂ˆ b
(s1)  
X(k,:)
 
∂E ˆ G
∂ˆ b
(s1+1)  
X(k,:)
 
−
∂E ˆ G
∂ˆ b
(s1)  
X(k,:)
 

         

                               
∞
< δ,
for some δ > 0.
The collocation nodes are distributed with a support covering ± 4 unconditional standard
deviations of the exogenous state variable and the realizations of the endogenous state vari-
able when simulating the model. We use MATLAB routines from the CompEcon toolbox
of Miranda and Fackler (2002) to obtain the Gaussian quadrature approximation of the in-
novations to the demand shock, and to evaluate the spline functions and their ﬁrst-order
derivatives.
B Optimal time-consistent policy with a variable labor
income tax rate
The Bellman equation reads:
V (st) = min
{ˆ πt,ˆ Yt, ˆ Gt,it,ˆ bt,ˆ τN
t }
 
1
2
 
ˆ π
2
t + λ
 
ˆ Yt − Γ ˆ Gt
 2
+ λG ˆ G
2
t
 
+ βEtV (st+1)
 
28subject to
ˆ πt = βEtˆ π(st+1) + κ
 
ˆ Yt − Γ ˆ Gt +
(σ + η)−1
1 − τN ˆ τ
N
t
 
ˆ Yt = ˆ Gt + Etˆ Y (st+1) − Et ˆ G(st+1) −
1
σ
(it − Etˆ π(st+1) − r
∗) + dt
ˆ bt =
1
β
 
ˆ bt−1 −
b
Y
ˆ πt +
 
1 + τ
C +
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
Nσ
 
ˆ Gt −
 
τ
C +
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
N (1 + σ + η)
 
ˆ Yt
−
1 + τC
(1 − τN)
2ˆ τ
N
t
 
+
b
Y
(it − r
∗)
it ≥ 0,
and the law of motion for the demand shock (7).
The consolidated ﬁrst-order conditions read
 
(1 − Γ)κ+
 
1 −
τN
1 − τN
 
1 + τC 
(1 + η) − (1 − Γ)κ
b
Y
  
b
Y
+
1 + τC
1 − τN
σ + η
κ
 −1 
ˆ πt
+(1 − Γ)λˆ Yt + (λG − (1 − Γ)λΓ) ˆ Gt = 0
Etˆ π(st+1) +
  
b
Y
+
1 + τC
1 − τN
σ + η
k
 
1
β
Ω2t − Ω1t
 
ˆ πt − Ω3tΦzlb
t = 0
Φzlb
t it = 0
Φzlb
t ≥ 0
it ≥ 0,
as well as the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the dynamic IS curve and the government
budget constraint, where
Φ
zlb
t ≡
 
b
Y
 
σ +
κ
β
 
+
1
β
 
τ
C +
1 + τC
1 − τN τ
N (1 + σ + η)
  
ˆ πt
−
1
β
 
b
Y
+
1 + τC
1 − τN
σ + η
k
  
κˆ πt + λ
 
ˆ Yt − Γ ˆ Gt
  
Ω1t ≡ 1 − σ
b
Y
 
∂Etˆ Y (st+1)
∂ˆ bt
−
∂Et ˆ G(st+1)
∂ˆ bt
 
Ω2t ≡ β
∂Etˆ π(st+1)
∂ˆ bt
Ω3t ≡
∂Etˆ Y (st+1)
∂ˆ bt
−
∂Et ˆ G(st+1)
∂ˆ bt
+
1
σ
∂Etˆ π(st+1)
∂ˆ bt
.
29The variable Φzlb
t is the (normalized) multiplier associated with the zero lower bound con-
straint.
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